By: Rusty Keeble

Law enforcement does a tremendous job of arresting, prosecuting and incarcerating gang members into our nation’s correctional facilities.

Today, millions of convicted felons are housed within our jails and prisons throughout the United States. Many of those are active gang members most of which are leaders, recruiters, enforcers and elders, therefore staying connected and in charge of the streets they used to run are paramount to their staying in control. This means that if we truly want to get our “finger on the pulse” of the gang activity within our communities, we need to look no further than behind the walls of our nation’s correctional facilities.

Correctional agencies have historically gathered a tremendous amount of information and intelligence on inmates and offenders. Most of this data is maintained in a single internal database with little to no cross-referencing capabilities or connectivity to outside agencies. This leads to a lack of sharing of inmate profile information. In essence, the work related data collection is complete, but it is without the benefits associated with when there is no examination, analysis, and practical application of the data in a pro-active manner.

Correctional agencies can assist outside law enforcement in a comprehensive and efficient manner by increasing and expanding the capabilities of current information systems and/or revise current policies and procedures to authorize the collaboration with law enforcement and the sharing of inmate information.

For example, almost all correctional agencies nationwide capture visitor information for inmate visitations and financial transactions for inmate account deposits and withdraws. This data yields a wealth of information detailing visits to multiple facilities and/or inmates and reveals which of these visits include money transactions. The results can be used to identify sophisticated networks for the introduction of contraband such as drugs, weapons or cell phones into the correctional facility.  They provide evidence for the subsequent prosecution of the individuals involved.  As agencies develop intelligence units, they must be aware of the potential sources of information available to them, within the corrections setting.
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Sources of information can range from general observation of inmate behavior by correctional officers to the interception and recovery of detailed gang documents, organizational charts, codes and communications to graffiti identification.

Inmate Phone Monitoring.

The use of the inmate phone system is a primary source of communications for both gang member and non-gang member inmates. The recording of these phone calls, enhanced by the assigning of personal identification numbers to each inmate, can result in useful criminal intelligence related to past, current and future crimes committed. Some inmate telephone systems have “key word” capturing technology where you supply the system with a list of key or “target” words such as “murder, kill, assassinate, cocaine or even codes like KOS (kill on sight).” These systems will monitor all phone conversations for these key words in real time and flag that inmate for further review by the investigative unit for possible crimes or threats. Some phone systems can even go as far as having a “targeted” inmate conversation forwarded to your own cell phone where you can listen in on the conversation in real time without the inmate knowing it and of course all calls are recorded and can be pulled for investigative and/or prosecutorial purposes.

Example 1: An inmate arrested for defrauding the elderly was identified, via his phone conversations, explaining to an accomplice on the outside the steps to take to defraud new victims for him while he was incarcerated using his jail sentence as a back story for the fraud. In other words, he was doing what he was arrested for still while he was serving time for the same crime. He never stopped.
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Example 2: Through an inside snitch, an inmate, arrested for stalking his girlfriend, attempted to hire a hit man from inside the jail – happened to be our snitch. We set the inmate up with an undercover officer, via the inmate phone system to introduce the hit man to the inmate where we were able to get recordings of his intentions and set up the hit. We then set up an actual meet, via inmate visitation (see inmate video visitation below) to solidify his intentions to kill her and provide (fake) proof of death to him.

Visitation Records.

Most inmate visitations are tracked on an agency-wide database/system that also tracks visitor information, dates, times, and quantities of visits – not to mention if a single visitor is visiting more than one inmate over a period of time. This can build an association between two inmates you had yet to identify.

There are three types of visitation used today; (1) Contact Visitation; where the inmate and the visitor are physically in the same room at the same table – usually authorized one hug and possible kiss prior to and following the visit, (2) Bank Teller Type Visitation; where the inmate and visitor are separated by a thick piece of shatter proof glass and cannot physically touch each other but talk through either holes in the glass or two-way phone system and (3) Video Visitation; where the inmate and visitor are not even in the same room and in some agencies are not even on the same compound. They visit, via video conferencing.

The latter is the best for intelligence gathering and for security purposes as it all but eliminates contraband introduction and has recording capabilities to record an inmate’s visit.

Example 1: Through an inside snitch, an inmate, arrested for stalking his girlfriend, attempted to hire a hit man from inside the jail – happened to be our snitch. We set the inmate up with an undercover officer, via the inmate phone system to introduce the hit man to the inmate where we were able to get recordings of his intentions and set up the hit. We then set up an actual meet, via inmate visitation (see inmate video visitation below) to solidify his intentions to kill her and provide (fake) proof of death to him. After the “fake death” was staged, the inmate and hit man met face to face (screen to screen) where the inmate was shown our (fake) proof of death and he closed the deal by thanking us and saying how he would get us the money – all of which was being recorded, via the inmate video visitation system. He was re-arrested for this and sentenced to 12 years in prison.
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Example 2: An inmate gang member scheduled a visit with a high ranking member of the gang he was in where he was given his “promotion” test, via visitation to gain rank within his gang. This was not known to us at the time but a subsequent cell search identified the gang knowledge he had been studying for the rank promotion and we were able to pull his visitation logs and identify the ranking gang member who had visited and tested him – of which he was not known or documented by either the correctional or law enforcement agencies. This allowed us to identify a high ranking gang member still in society and flag him in the correctional system if he was re-arrested as well as identify the inmate gang member had been promoted within the gang. 

Inmate Mail Cover.

The review of all mail coming in and going out of a correctional facility is paramount to both protecting the safety and security of the public and your facility – especially if they are documented gang members. For your gang members, the logging and tracking of these outside contacts is extremely beneficial. Detailed charting of associations and organizational structures can be established both inside and outside the facility. Many gang charters, constitutions, contracts for assassinations, and other critical intelligence can be developed from the use of inmate mail cover.

Suggestion: Ensure that you have a policy of no signs, symbols, etc on the outside of any incoming or outgoing mail. Simple name and address from sender and recipient.

However, be sure to review and intimately understand your state’s restrictions related to legal and privileged mail, i.e., legal mail, etc before implementing this intelligence-gathering method.
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Example: Gang members knew that we would monitor their mail and confiscate any gang paraphernalia from them for intelligence purposes and most likely return the mail to the sender and not let correspondence through. From time to time, the gang members and their associates would use the mail system to send us messages within their letters to tell us about current activities in the system from their rivals. This is an intelligence source and communication method that can be used by both you and the inmates to keep abreast of what is going on in your facilities. 

Financial Transactions.

The first rule of any investigation is to “follow the money.” Most agencies have resorted to cashless commissaries and prohibiting the possession of currency. This makes it necessary for inmates to rely on money order transactions to engage in criminal enterprises. Detailed tracking of all depositors and recipients of money orders by name and location can result in detailed linkages to criminal associates.

Some systems have the capability of flagging an inmate’s account if more than set amount is ever deposited at one time. Why does an inmate need $500 a week put into his/her account? Where did it come from? If he/she is not purchasing commissary and not running a large balance then where is it going?

This technique is extremely effective when used on a statewide or nationwide basis for those state and federal (nationwide) agencies or private corrections companies.

Suggestion: I recommend having a weekly report sent to you, as the investigative or intelligence entity, of all inmates who have $500 or more (possibly $250 depending on agency size and demographics) in their inmate account as well as large deposits of $200 or more for review, and monitoring for potential illegal or security threat activities.

Example 1: We noticed that every Monday morning there was an influx of deposits and at the time, lines of depositors waiting to make deposits that shall we say – looked to be in the private “entertainment” profession if you know what I mean. When we cross referenced those deposits with the inmate recipients, it showed that most had a reputation or background in being pimps. In essence what we found was that the prostitutes would work all weekend long and then come to the jail and deposit the money into their pimps – the inmate’s account. Not only was the proficient for the inmate as we were acting like his own personal bank but we were in essence cleaning his money for him as it came in from illegal means and then going back out clean as whistle. This also was a great source of intelligence as it gave us leads to numerous other crimes being committed by supplying us with a list of potential targets and associates.
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Example 2: An inmate is getting a lot of deposits from another inmate or group of inmates – Why? Family connection? Gang Connection or inmate bullying, extortion or cell boss activity?

Documents.

It is very common for traditional gangs such as the Black Gangster Disciples or Latin Kings to have charters, constitutions, recruiting documents and other gang-related materials. These documents are almost always in cryptic code or subliminally hidden in artwork. Coded messages are communicated in letters and outside of envelopes using these codes. These items are considered gang paraphernalia and should be against your agencies policies for inmate possession. It should be considered security threat documents therefore considered contraband.
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Suggestion: Do not simply categorize these documents as “contraband” but as gang-related paraphernalia that carries a disciplinary consequence for possession of – in our agency, we created a disciplinary charge just for the possession of gang paraphernalia that resulted in 20 days of disciplinary confinement with loss of all privileges including loss of 20 days gain time. Being an “active” gang member in your system has to carry a hefty price to pay.

Graffiti.

We all know that graffiti is used by gang members both inside the correctional facilities as well as the community to communicate with each other, to rival gangs or simply to claim a territory. It is considered the newspaper of the streets or system if you are in corrections. As in the streets, gang-related graffiti in a corrections environment can cause confrontational behavior between inmates and among different gangs. Disrespect to rival gangs and their members is accomplished by displaying their symbols in a degrading manner such as upside down, crossed out, backwards or broken. This type of graffiti encourages retaliation with a required response from the gang being disrespected. This will no doubt lead into a physical altercation.

Suggestion: Every agency should have a robust graffiti identification, removal and enforcement program where gang-related graffiti is identified, properly documented through photos, video and eventually analyzed and deciphered for content and purpose. Once this has been done, you will need to remove the graffiti has quickly as possible to reduce the amount of recognition among the inmate population. Lastly, conduct an investigation into who did the graffiti and if possible charge them internally with a disciplinary action for “defacing government/agency property through graffiti” which should that result in 20 days of disciplinary confinement with loss of all privileges including loss of 20 days gain time and freeze the inmate’s account till restitution for the cost to paint the area is covered. You hit them with loss of their freedom, their commissary, their gain time and their money and you have stripped them of everything important to them – showed that this behavior will not be tolerated.

You will also need to determine what the graffiti was written with and make every attempt to limit the use of these items by your inmate population.
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Example: An officer does his end of the night security inspections and notices that there was a large area of graffiti that was not previous there – he realizes through symbol identification that it was gang-related and notifies his supervisor. Through interviewing the inmate and further investigation it was discovered the graffiti was showing an alliance that had taken place between the Latin Kings and the NETA while incarcerated to go to war against the Gangster Disciples, Crips and other Black inmates for a repositioning of power. In essence, the Hispanics had enough of the Blacks being in charge. We were about to have a race war – but an officer’s initiative to first identify the graffiti and then act upon it kept that from happening. After several gang member management techniques applied, not a single fight took place. 

Inmate Cooperation.

Better referred to as a “snitch,” there is no better way to gather intelligence about the activities going on in the corrections environment and/or in the community you serve. Every inmate in your system is a potential source of information. There can be many different reasons why an inmate would choose to cooperate with you but none of them should be because you provide them with special favors or items of reward for doing so. Being a snitch isn’t a business and they are not your employee so they are not going to get paid for their cooperation. Yes, there are circumstances, although rare and well above your pay grade will the decision to do otherwise occur.

Hint: We also find that gang members love to snitch on their rival gangs.

Suggestion: No matter how well established, remember to never take an inmate’s word as gospel or the final word – at the end of the day, they are still inmates and gang members and can turn on you in an instance providing you with false or misleading information to lead you down the wrong path or a path of danger. As with any intelligence source, capture and verify.

Example 1: Through an inside snitch, an inmate, arrested for stalking his girlfriend, attempted to hire a hit man from inside the jail – happened to be our snitch. We set the inmate up with an undercover officer, via the inmate phone system to introduce the hit man to the inmate where we were able to get recordings of his intentions and set up the hit. We then set up an actual meet, via inmate visitation (see inmate video visitation below) to solidify his intentions to kill her and provide (fake) proof of death to him. After the “fake death” was staged, the inmate and hit man met face to face (screen to screen) where the inmate was shown our (fake) proof of death and he closed the deal by thanking us and saying how he would get us the money – all of which was being recorded, via the inmate video visitation system. He was re-arrested for this and sentenced to 12 years in prison.
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Example 2: An inmate had been recruited by a gang through a promise of protection. Once recruited, the new gang member changed his mind when he found out he had to carry out a mission in order to be fully accepted. When the gang refused to allow him to back out – he came to us and asked us for assistance. Not only did he give up everything that he had learned but it brought attention to a gang that we didn’t even know had a presence in our system that was actively and aggressively recruiting – more than 75 inmates by the time we were made aware.

Conclusion

A corrections environment is merely a microcosm of the very community it serves to protect. It also contains a treasure trove of information and acts as an incubator for criminal activity. The public, by design and being uninformed, have a misconception of how a corrections environment operates and that to remove the threat or the criminal activity from the street (public), you must simply arrest and incarcerate – believing they disappear into this dark hole they call jail/prison (sarcastically speaking) never to have access to society again until released. Basically, believing the threat is gone.

Law enforcement, has traditionally held a similar belief, although not as misconceived as the public’s perception but nevertheless, law enforcement historically would make the arrest, deliver them to the local jail and move on with the investigation believing that the suspect is in jail and can’t continue with their criminal activity – not stopping long enough to realize that just because the suspect is in jail doesn’t mean that he/she still doesn’t have access to the streets and/or control the streets therefore directly impacting the officer’s investigation.

Another example of this mindset is how we forget that some inmates although technically incarcerated may be part of the work release program where they work in society at an actual place of business during the day but returns to the corrections center at night all while the initial victim, the public and the law enforcement officer who arrested him has no idea he is walking amongst them during the day and returning to jail at night just to do it all again tomorrow.

Because of this, many inmates believe they can continue and in some cases increase their activity because they know that no one has them on their radar anymore. Law enforcement has forgotten about them and corrections agencies don’t traditionally care them or what they are doing.

This is where CAGE comes into play.

Being aggressive with a zero tolerance position for gang and/or security threat activity is the core purpose of an Office of Security Intelligence and the Corrections Anti-Gang Enforcement Unit. CAGE will pick up where law enforcement left off monitoring the inmates every move as they work their way through the system and upon their eventual release using the above intelligence gathering techniques and working with law enforcement to ensure that there are no gaps in the intelligence or investigative process while better ensuring that the corrections agency is more aggressively, effectively and efficiently maintaining its charge of protecting the public. 

Are you prepared?

By: Lou Savelli

Blue on Blue

​Anytime a law enforcement officer is killed, it is a tragedy.  That goes without saying! However, when one law enforcement officer is the person killing the other law enforcement officer, no matter how much went wrong with the confrontation, regardless of who made a mistake, it is beyond a tragedy and wounds will never heal on both sides, far and wide.  As you can tell, I am being very careful of my wording about this situation that has gotten little discussion.  It’s as if no one wants to talk about it and as I found out, no one wanted to tackle this issue, at least in public, so here I am… tackling it!  I am not going to pass blame on anyone or anything but I will, forcefully, offer recommendations for avoiding, handing and surviving blue on blue encounters. 

The Problem

​Are Blue on Blue Confrontations a problem for modern law enforcement?  If one cop gets killed or injured, then it’s a tragedy that needs to be understood and it’s definitely a problem that needs to be analyzed.  Solutions need to be devised. As I found out, through extensive research, there have been many law enforcement officers who have been killed in Blue on Blue Confrontations and, in my opinion, there are scores more that did not have their lives end in tragedy that we have never heard about.  We don’t even have access to the facts of many of these cases to analyze and use these facts to devise solutions. 

My Personal Experiences

​As a cop for 25 years and 90 % of that in plainclothes, I have had my share of cop’s guns pointed at me.  I have been shot at (by bad guys and cops too!) and pulled my gun on cops who were on duty and off.  I was part of a panel discussion and analysis of mass shootings called Massive Reflexive Response (MRR), now called contagious shootings.  What I learned from my experience and analysis of shootings was that each incident was unique and occasionally mistakes were made but I also learned that most can be avoided with the right policies, procedures and training.

Research Results

​In the US, in the last 30 years, there have been 29 incidents that can be classified as Blue on Blue Confrontations, though each was quite different, that have ended in an officer being killed by a fellow officer.  Of those 29 officers killed, many of the officers were off duty, most were in plainclothes and two were acting in an undercover capacity.  What they all had in common was they resulted in mistaken identity.

To emphasize the seriousness, I want everyone to understand that there are victims of these incidents.   Yes!  There are victims.  In the case of Blue on Blue Confrontations that end in death there are many victims.  These victims range from the officer killed and his/her family, friends and coworkers to the officer who killed a fellow officer and his/her family and coworkers.  How hard must it be to cope with killing another human being, and how very hard it must be to cope with killing a fellow law enforcement officer?  I thank God every day that it never happened to me. 

The Aftermath

After a death, or serious injury, of a fellow law enforcement officer as a result of a Blue on Blue Confrontation, there is much devastation.  We all, in the law enforcement family, understand that an officer can get killed doing, what we like to call, “God’s Work” yet we find it difficult to handle.  Yet how can we understand when one law enforcement officer takes another officer’s life, especially when both sides are trying to do “God’s Work”?  What are the families left to think of us as law enforcement officers and this job we do that causes us to take the life of another officer?  Do lawyers kill other lawyers in the courtroom? Maybe they do, figuratively, but not literally!  Do doctors kill other doctors while they are practicing medicine? Of course not!

How bitter we must all be when such a death happens.  Usually, we can blame the bad guy and focus our anger on him and others like him.  We can hate his defense attorney and those who support him but how can we hate another officer for doing his job, especially when he/she truly believes he is saving his own life or the lives of the citizens nearby?  How does the widow or widower explain to the children of a dead officer who died at the hands of another officer?  What do you say?  How do we all feel?  How much confusion is there?
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The aftermath is that of great difficulty and confusion with broken hearts and broken spirits.  And in many cases, blame is passed upon someone who was considered previously a friend, a protector or family.  Many questions arise, or at least they are thought.  Was it a case of prejudice?  Was hatred involved?  Did someone break the rules?  Who was overzealous? Who was at fault?  Or who was more wrong?

Social Implications

​Whether we like to discuss it, or not, we must!  Yes, the 800 pound gorilla.  We have to discuss it, especially when it comes to Blue on Blue Confrontations.  Is race an issue? Why are so many minority officers victims of Blue on Blue deaths?  Is it so many?  It seems so.  Or are political activists just trying to stir everyone up at the expense of our nation’s law enforcement officers. Is it just for their own benefit or is there good reason for it?  I’m not sure, but I can tell you the truth about the social implications of Blue on Blue Confrontations.  We have to deal with them and add it to our training.  We need to do it TODAY so it doesn’t happen again. Do we all, no matter how trained we are, bring our own personal prejudices into the equation?  Do we bring our own perception into it?  Of course, we all do!

So, has race been an issue in Blue on Blue Confrontations ending in tragedy?  As an analyzer of facts and the available research, I am not sure.  As a cop, a human being and an observer of people, I am still not sure.  But what I am sure is that people, even cops, bring their personal prejudices and perception of reality to their interactions.  We all know it!  Yet race does not seem to be a distinguishable factor in the available information.

According to my research, there have been 29 officers killed in confrontations with other officers.  Fifteen were white, thirteen were Black and one was Hispanic.  Therefore, according to the statistics available on the Officer Down Memorial Page and other research available, more white officers have been killed by white officers than minority officers have been killed by white officers.  In fact, some minority officers were killed by minority officers.  But were these officers trained properly to handle such situations?

But what are the social implications?  Well, if we, as law enforcement officers think it and community members feel it then there are social implications.  So, to best summarize it, I will quote law enforcement officers, community members and family members close to a Blue on Blue Tragedy that occurred in the past few years.  It has again raised questions about social issues, such as race in the Blue on Blue tragic death of Omar Edwards, a well-liked off-duty NYPD officer attempting to apprehend a suspect trying to steal his personal car. In a YouTube video that can be found at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fERCRVJN_tc, Detective Edwards friends, colleagues and law enforcement activists, voice their thoughts and opinions about Omar, his death and the questions that have been left unanswered.

Factors Contributing to These Tragedies

​Yes, there are contributing factors that led to these tragedies!  And yes, absent these contributing factors, many of the officers killed would be alive, or at least I believe so. Contributing factors range widely and they seem to exist, often, on both sides of the confrontation.  Without naming specific incidents and especially not naming any officers, or agencies, involved, I will list those contributing factors from my own educated and experienced findings by the frequency and importance.  The top of the list is the Lack of a Confrontation Policy, next is Lack of a Confrontation Procedures and third is Lack of Training on both. Most agencies, of the agencies from which over 300 officers I have interviewed, have left officers untrained and confused about Blue on Blue Confrontations and how to handle them, nevertheless avoid them.  Yes, we all know the uniform officer is in charge.  WE GET IT!  But it is not always that simple. And what if the challenging officer isn’t wearing a uniform?  See, we need more information…more policy, more procedure and more training!

As I started discussing Blue on Blue Confrontations and training law enforcement officers on effective procedures, as far back as the year 2000, I was consistently amazed how the majority of officers, from a wide-variety of law enforcement agencies, approximately 95%, did not know how to effectively act in a confrontation with another officer on both sides of the confrontation.  Consistently, officers had not received formal training on what to do during such situations.  Specialized officers, such as plainclothes officers, undercover officers, narcotics investigators and surveillance specialists are much more prone to become involved in a confrontation, received nothing more than “...the uniform officer is in charge!”  Yet, one of the consistent safety concerns that arose in discussion, consistently, was their concerns of being shot by a fellow officer who couldn’t readily identify them during a confrontation. It immediately made me realize I had to add a segment for dealing with Blue on Blue Confrontations in training related to narcotics investigations, undercover operations, plainclothes operations, physical surveillance and others.  Of course, I stressed how important was for the plainclothes officers must completely comply with uniformed officers and identify themselves before they take action.

Next on the list of contributing factors to Blue on Blue Confrontations ending in tragedy is the Failure of the ‘confronted’ officer to submit to the orders of the ‘confronting’ officer(s). For example, many officers (of the available research) did not submit to orders to “DROP THE GUN!”, or “DON’T MOVE!” or to verbally respond to orders or instructions given by ‘confronting’ officer(s), EVEN WHEN THE CONFRONTING OFFICERS WERE IN UNIFORM. But why didn’t the ‘confronted’ officers respond?  It was not uncommon for confronted officers to fail to respond to verbal orders because of ‘Auditory Exclusion’ caused by stress.  Auditory Exclusion, the shutting down of hearing or inability to hear due to stress-related focus on a violent or threatening situation, is also associated with, and can go hand in hand with, Tunnel Vision. Tunnel Vision is the narrow focus of vision or attention that prevents an officer involved in a stress-related situation to see outside of a narrow view.  Such narrow view can be limited to a specific situation, person or thing. The main problem is that Auditory Exclusion and Tunnel Vision are difficult to identify in rapidly evolving situations like Blue on Blue Confrontations.

Another contributing factor may have been related to, or causing, Auditory Exclusion and Tunnel vision.  They are a response to the stressors, or stimuli, connected to armed and/or violent situations and this is called Tachypsychia.  Tachypsychia is a neurological condition that alters the perception of time, usually induced by physical exertion, drug use, or a traumatic event and can include Auditory Exclusion, Tunnel Vision, Selective Attention, immediate PTSD Symptoms and other debilitating symptoms. These same symptoms could be suffered by the ‘confronting’ officer(s) contributing to the Blue on Blue Confrontation, however because of the limited information available in Blue on Blue confrontations; research did not reveal such a factor. Undoubtedly, in my opinion, if a confronting officer suffers from Tunnel Vision he/she may not see a badge displayed and if a confronting officer is suffering from Auditory Exclusion, he/she may not hear statements such as “I’m a Police Officer!”

Mistaken Identity has been the frequent label used to categorize the Blue on Blue Confrontation leading to a tragedy but there are many factors that can contribute to mistaken identity.  Such factors include Failure on the part of the ‘confronted’ officer to properly identify himself and the inability on the part of the ‘confronting’ officers to effectively assess the situation.  Of course we can all Monday morning quarterback and say that certain things needed to be done.  In reality, armed confrontations are highly stressful, rapidly evolving, confusing situations involving the threat of deadly physical force.  They are too complex to say things like “He should have done this and she should have done that…!”  They happened fast.

Failure of officers to properly identify themselves, on both sides of a confrontation, can happen for a variety of reasons.  Some of these reasons may be beyond their control.  Such reasons, for example, can range from the inability to obtain and display a badge and/or ID because it is inaccessible to not carrying a badge or ID or an imminently threatening situation making it difficult to produce or access the badge and/or ID.  Realistically, the factors, on both sides of the confrontation, can be vast.

Ineffective identification, such as wearing a badge on the belt can be another contributing factor.  Wearing the badge on around the neck facing front, while the confronting officer is at the rear, may not be totally effective but a recent study by the Kansas City, MO, Police Department shows it is far more effective than a belt badge holder. Identification that is absent a ‘POLICE’ raid jacket, or some other obvious identifier, can also be ineffective in the wrong situation and off-duty cops don’t walk around with ‘POLICE’ raid jackets in their pockets just in case they are going to get involved. But they should, always, carry their badge and ID with them!  One way that just might be the most effective way to identifying yourself to responding officers is by having your badge in your non-shooting hand that can be shown while you ‘cover’ the bad guy at gunpoint.
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Failure to use proper dialogue can be another factor that can lead to a tragic end.  One of my pet peeves, partially because of my ‘old school’’ NYPD training, is the utilization of ‘Mutual Cop Dialogue’. During a confrontation, especially when one officer’s identity is in question, badge or no badge, effective cop dialogue can help. The lack of dialogue between officers on both sides can have dangerous outcomes. When an officer says, “POLICE DON’T MOVE!” and the other doesn’t respond that makes for a very tense situation.  Using mutual dialogue can help ease the tension.  The other officer can respond, “I’m a Police Officer, I work in Fifth Precinct!” The confronting officer might say, “What tour do you work?”  The response could be “I work third shift, four to twelves!” That phrase itself, “…third shift” is a cop phrase.  It can make a confronting officer relax a bit.  If he wants more information to be sure if he is dealing with a cop, he may ask, “What’s the boss in charge of your shift called?”  If he’s a cop, he’ll say, “He’s the Platoon Commander.”  The dialogue can go many ways to help the confronting officer realize that he is actually dealing with an officer. 

Other factors that can contribute to Blue on Blue Confrontations, and/or the tragic end to such confrontations, can be various. Here are some examples with a brief explanation:

• Improper Tactical Operation Planning:  Tactical operations, such as Search Warrant Executions, Undercover Operations, Case Takedowns, Surveillance and Decoy Operations require Tactical Operation Planning.  Part of the Tactical Operation Plan should include ways to avoid conflict with other personnel, safeguards and a confrontation procedure should occur. 
• Lack of Deconfliction:  Deconfliction is a simple, easy to understand, word yet many law enforcement officers don’t understand it and some still don’t use it.  Deconfliction means TO AVOID CONFLICT and it now a common law enforcement tool used to avoid confrontations. Widely used by narcotics investigators across the US, especially in big cities, deconfliction should be used to help keep officers safe while engaged in tactical or proactive investigative operations.  When it won’t compromise an investigation, deconfliction should be used in many situations and it does not always have to be ‘official’ in nature.  Making a notification to a local precinct or jurisdiction, can not only help avoid confrontations it can bring help in case it is needed.
• Arrogance:  Yes, there are cops who are arrogant.  Imagine that!  Arrogance can cause one cop to disregard the orders or authority of another.  Whether the arrogance is caused by rank, stature or just plain ego, it makes for a dangerous situation during a confrontation. Arrogance can happen on both sides of a confrontation.  Officers need to put that crap aside and act and think professionally.
• Improper Conclusions:  Cops come in all shapes, sizes, genders and colors and everyone needs to understand that.  Believing someone of color can’t be a cop is not only stupid, it can be deadly. Assessing the situation, based on intelligently acquired information, will lead to accurate conclusions and better decision-making.
• Making and Arrest from an Undercover Posture:  Undercover officers are supposed to look like street people, and it’s even better when they look like bad guys. However, undercover officers are just that – undercover- and they are not supposed to take independent action because they can be mistaken for a bad guy. That’s what back-up teams are for! Not only will good guys think an undercover officer is a bad guy, the bad guys will think the same thing and fight, resist, run and shoot it out. And when the uniform officers arrive, they are looking for people who look like bad guys. 

Recommendations

​My recommendations to effectively avoid, handle and survive Blue on Blue Confrontations, involves the creation of efficient Policy and Procedures, enhanced with proper training.  Law enforcement officers should also be directed to carry their law enforcement badge and identification at all times and produce them immediately upon deciding to become involved, on or off duty, when in plainclothes. Agencies should discourage officers from taking action off-duty.  Being a good ‘expert’ witness should be preferable than being a good cop who risks his/her life. There should be strict guidelines for plainclothes officers and specific ways they identify themselves.   And agencies need to train, and remind, on duty personnel of how to identify off duty and plainclothes officers and use cover in confrontation situations. 

​Conclusion

​Maybe I raised more questions than I answered in this writing. Sometimes it works out that way when you set out to expose something, especially an important and controversial topic. Whatever I raised, I hope I raised everyone’s awareness and understanding of the need for further investigation and policy. Maybe I have been lucky in my many personal experiences with Blue on Blue Confrontations and maybe my experience as an undercover officer, plainclothes officer, detective and supervisor has provided me with more respect and understanding of such situations to help me remain safe and not injure another cop. Or maybe I was just lucky! I think, with no reservations, there is nothing that can take the place of real-life diverse experience, but in the case of avoiding, handling and surviving Blue on Blue Confrontations to circumvent tragedies, effective policy, procedures and training comes real close.